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ABSTRACT. Since the early part of the 20th century, the federal government has engaged in a long and slow process
of devolution in the Canadian Arctic. Although the range of powers devolved to the territorial governments has been
substantial over the years, the federal government still maintains control over the single most important jurisdiction in
the region, territorial lands and resources, which it controls in two of the three territories, the Northwest Territories and
Nunavut. This fact is significant for territorial governments because gaining jurisdiction over their lands and resources
is seen as necessary for dramatically improving the lives of residents and governments in the Canadian north. Relying
on archival materials, secondary sources, and 33 elite interviews, this paper uses a rational choice framework to
explain why the Yukon territorial government was able to complete a final devolution agreement relating to lands
and resources in 2001 and why the governments of the Northwest Territories and Nunavut have not. It finds that the
nature and distance of federal-territorial preferences, combined with government perceptions of aboriginal consent
and federal perceptions of territorial capacity and maturity, explain the divergent outcomes experienced by the three
territorial governments in the Canadian arctic.
The following acronyms are employed: AIP: Agreement-in-Principle; DTA: Devolution Transfer Agreement; GEB:
gross expenditure base; GN: Government of Nunavut; GNWT: Government of Northwest Territories; NCLA: Nunavut
Land Claims Agreement; NTI: Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated; NWT; Northwest Territories; ON: Ontario; TFF:
Territorial Formula Financing; UFA: Umbrella Final Agreement; YDTA: Yukon Devolution Transfer Agreement;
YTG: Yukon Territorial Government; YK: Yukon;
Introduction
Residents in Canada’s three northern territories have long
faced significant challenges relating to living and govern-
ing in the arctic. Recognising this fact, the federal govern-
ment has, since the early part of the 20th century, engaged
in a long and slow process of devolution, which is the
transfer of province-like powers such as health care, edu-
cation, social services, transportation, public works, and
local government to the territorial governments (Dacks
1990; Dacks and Coates 1988; White 2002). It has also
negotiated with the Inuit to create the territory of Nunavut
in 1999, and negotiated with other aboriginal groups to
create aboriginal governments in the Yukon Territory and
the Northwest Territories (NWT). With these devolved
powers, politicians and policymakers hope that the ter-
ritorial governments of Yukon, NWT, and Nunavut can
better manage and address the challenges particular to
their regions (Okalik 2006; O’Brien 2006; Rayner 2001).
Although the range of powers devolved to the ter-
ritorial governments has been substantial, the federal
government still maintains partial control over the single
most important jurisdiction in the region, territorial lands
and resources, which it controls in two of the three
territories, NWT and Nunavut. This fact is significant
for territorial governments because gaining jurisdiction
over their lands and resources is seen as necessary for
dramatically improving the lives of territorial residents
and governments in the Canadian north (Abele and
Prince 2008; Irlbacher-Fox and Mills 2007; McArthur
2007; O’Brien 2006; Rayner 2001). Indeed, territorial
lands have long been known to contain vast deposits
of highly sought after non-renewable resources, which
could provide substantial long term revenues for the
territorial governments (Abele 2009: 41–42; Government
of Northwest Territories 1998; Grady 2001: 4).
In 2001, the Yukon territorial government negotiated
a devolution agreement with the federal government that
gave it control over its lands and resources in 2003
(Government of Canada and Government of the Yukon
2001; Natcher and Davis 2007). In contrast, negotiations
to complete similar devolution agreements with the gov-
ernments of the NWT and Nunavut have yet to come to
fruition. Although the government of Nunavut (GN) has
signed a protocol agreement and the government of the
Northwest Territories (GNWT) has signed an agreement-
in-principle (AIP) with the federal government (for the
NWT, see Memorandum 2001; Government of Canada
and others 2004; for Nunavut see Government of Canada
and others 2008; Mayer 2007), a number of informed
observers and recent events indicate that neither territory
is likely to complete a final devolution agreement in the
near future.
In light of the importance of devolution to the eco-
nomic and social prosperity of Canada’s territorial com-
munities and governments, this paper seeks to address
the following question: why was the Yukon territorial
government able to achieve a devolution agreement re-
lating to land and resources in 2001, and why have
the NWT and Nunavut governments not been able to
complete such an agreement? To answer these questions,
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this paper relies on 33 semi-structured open interviews
with federal, territorial, and aboriginal officials in Ottawa,
ON, Whitehorse, YK, and Yellowknife, NWT, archival
materials gathered from the National and NWT Archives,
and relevant government documents, reports, and sec-
ondary materials. The evidence suggests that variation in
devolution negotiation outcomes can best be explained by
examining the preferences and relative bargaining power
of the negotiating governments, the federal government’s
perceptions of territorial maturity and capacity, and the
actions of the aboriginal veto players in each territory.
The paper is organised as follows. It begins with
a historical sketch of devolution and the political/
constitutional development of the three territories. Next,
it specifies the theoretical framework that guides the
analysis before illustrating how this framework explains
the divergent outcomes. The paper concludes with a
discussion of the main findings.
Background considerations
The purpose of this section is to paint a brief historical
sketch of the political and constitutional development
of the territorial north. It focuses mainly on the NWT
and Yukon, emphasising that their territorial governments
were created originally as administrative regions to be
controlled directly by federal civil servants and bureau-
crats. Over time, however, the federal government has de-
volved a comprehensive set of province-like powers and
jurisdictions and allowed them to develop democratic,
representative, and responsible government. However,
much as it did when it created the provinces of Alberta
and Saskatchewan, the federal government has delayed
handing over lands and resources, finally transferring
those jurisdictions only to the Yukon territorial govern-
ment in 2003, and not to the others.
The Northwest Territories
The NWT, acquired from Britain in 1870, has deep
historical significance for Canada. Six of Canada’s ten
provinces were entirely carved or partially derived from
the NWT’s frontiers over the course of the country’s
history. As well, both the Yukon Territory in 1898 and
Nunvaut in 1999 were created out of the lands of the
NWT. The NWT, therefore, has long been crucial to the
nation-building project of Canada.
The federal government’s passing of the Northwest
Territory Act of 1875 marked the establishment of the
domestic legal basis for Dominion authority over the
region. This legislation confirmed the interim provisions
put in place by the federal government in 1870, which
established its direct control over, and delivery of basic
services to, the region. In 1905, the NWT Act was
amended to create the position of commissioner as chief
executive officer of the region, and established an advis-
ory Territorial Council made up of four appointed civil
servants from Ottawa. In 1919, the deputy minister of
the Department of the Interior was appointed permanent
Commissioner of the Territory, solidifying the bureau-
cratic and Ottawa-centric nature of governance in the
territory (Dickerson 1992: 29–30).
During the 1960s, the federal government became
interested in fostering greater autonomy in the north and
created the Carrothers Commission to examine the issue.
The commission recommended a number of things, in-
cluding replacing the Territorial Council with a legislative
assembly and creating a new territorial government and
bureaucracy in Yellowknife. Even before the Carrothers
Commission issued its final report, however, the federal
government in early 1964 appointed B.G. Sivertz as head
of a small territorial government office in Ottawa to
begin the transition. In 1965, the NWT Council passed
a public service ordinance to provide a legal basis for the
creation of a territorial bureaucracy (Zaslow 1988: 361).
Federal legislation in 1966 established a consolidated
revenue fund for the territorial government, giving it
a measure of financial independence. By the summer
of 1967, the new territorial government had appointed
department heads and hired staff members to replace fed-
eral officials from the Northern Administration Branch
(Zaslow 1988: 365–6) and by October 1967, social ser-
vices, transportation and public works were devolved
to the new territorial government. Health remained a
divided responsibility while in the field of education,
the GNWT assumed control over all schools run by the
federal government. By 1969, and ‘in a single stroke
of administrative devolution’, the GNWT had assumed
nearly all of the responsibilities that its provincial coun-
terparts enjoyed, except for natural resources (including
oil, gas, inland fisheries and forest management), and
full responsibility over health care delivery (Clancy 1990:
28).
With devolution mostly complete, territorial officials
turned their attention to establishing responsible govern-
ment and a fully elected NWT Council. By 1970, only
four appointed members remained on the 14-member
council. By 1975, the first fully elected NWT Council
took power, which was renamed the Legislative As-
sembly in 1976, and for the first time chose its own
speaker and two members of the Executive Committee.
The Assembly also succeeded in eventually gaining con-
trol over the number of constituencies in the territory and
immediately created 22 electoral constituencies. Later, it
would name seven members to the Executive Council,
reducing the number of unelected officials to two (Le-
gislative Assembly of the Northwest Territories 2010).
In 1980, the members of the assembly elected their
first government leader, George Braden. He finished
the process of creating full responsible government in
the territory by removing the commissioner and deputy
commissioner from the Executive Council in 1985 and
replacing them with elected members from the assembly.
In 1994, the assembly voted to change the title of govern-
ment leader to premier and bestow that title retroactively
on all those who served as government leader since
1980 (Legislative Assembly of the Northwest Territories
2010).
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Despite these important developments, the political/
constitutional development of the NWT is incomplete
because NWT lands and resources remain in the hands
of the federal government. During the mid to late 1980s,
the federal government indicated a willingness to transfer
lands and resources to the territories and began negoti-
ations on oil and gas (Dacks 1990: 241–243). Despite
extensive negotiations during the 1990s and 2000s, in-
cluding the signing of a highly controversial agreement
in principle in early 2011, the GNWT and the federal
government have yet to generate a final agreement. The
recent 2011 NWT territorial election and interview data
suggest that a final agreement is unlikely to be completed
in the foreseeable future.
Yukon Territory
One of the main reasons for creating the Yukon Territory
out of the western portion of the NWT was to deal with
the gold rush during the 1890s. With the arrival of almost
50,000 people to the Klondike, including many Amer-
icans, Ottawa felt the need to maintain sovereignty and
order in the area. Thus, the federal government passed
the Yukon Act in 1898, creating the Yukon Territory out
of the western portion of the NWT (Bone 2002: 6).
Early government in Yukon was similar to that in
the NWT. The Yukon Act empowered the Governor in
Council to administer the territory and allowed it ‘appoint
for the Yukon Territory a chief executive officer to be
styled and known as the Commissioner of the Yukon
Territory’ (Canada 1898). Much as in the NWT, the
commissioner had significant control over the territory
and was accountable only to Ottawa rather than to the
residents of Yukon (Morrison 1968: 20). To help the
commissioner with his duties, the Governor in Council
appointed a Yukon Council of six people (Canada 1898).
Gradually, the number of appointed members of the
council decreased until 1908 when all members became
elected members.
During the period between 1918 and 1950, the polit-
ical development of Yukon was retrenched. In 1919,
for instance, the federal government reduced the size of
the council from ten to three elected members (Coates
and Morrison 2005: 188). However, a number of de-
velopments in the 1940s and onwards reinvigorated the
political development of the territory, leading to the re-
establishment of the commissioner in 1948 and the ex-
pansion of the Yukon Council from three to five members
(Cameron and White 1995: 18). In 1961, the Yukon Act
was amended yet again through the establishment of an
Advisory Committee on Finance, which was made up of
three elected Yukon Council members (Smyth 1991: 28,
289). The commissioner was now obligated to consult
this advisory committee during budget preparations, thus
creating a measure of limited responsible government
(Cameron and White 1995: 20).
Also during this period, the civil service was reorgan-
ised and enlarged to deal with a variety of issues and to
clarify territorial and federal responsibilities in the region
(Michael 1987: 74). The federal government then began
to devolve some responsibilities to the Yukon govern-
ment, such as justice in 1971 and the Alaska Highway
and fisheries in 1972, to name a few. In 1970, the federal
government asked Commissioner James Smith to create
an Executive Committee made up of himself, two elected
members of council, and two assistant commissioners
(Smyth 1991: 37). This was a significant step toward
responsible government, and for the first time in Yukon,
‘elected officials were given portfolio responsibilities
in the administration of government and seats in the
executive body’ (Cameron and White 1995: 21).
With the creation and development of the Executive
Committee as well as the introduction of party politics
in 1978, a form of representative government had finally
developed. In June 1979, full responsible government
arrived when the Yukon territorial elected member and
leader, Chris Pearson, wrote a letter to federal minister
of Indian Affairs Jake Epp asking him to remove the
commissioner from the Executive Committee, abolish the
deputy commissioner, and rename the Executive Com-
mittee, the Executive Council. After receiving the letter,
Epp wrote to Commissioner Ione Christensen, instructing
her to ask the Territorial Government Leader, now to
be called Premier, to form an executive cabinet made
up of elected members of the Yukon Territorial Council.
The commissioner was instructed that he was now bound
to follow the advice of the council and the govern-
ment leader on all matters (Cameron and Gomme 1991:
161).
Leading up to the devolution transfer agreement of
2001, a number of important responsibilities were trans-
ferred to the Yukon Territory. During this decade, the
territorial government gained full control over health
services in the territory (Health Canada 2005). It also
received control over onshore oil and gas through the
Yukon Oil and Gas Accord in 1998 (Irlbacher-Fox and
Mills 2007: 5). At the same time during this period,
discussions commenced to transfer responsibility over
lands and natural resources to the territorial government.
The process began in 1996 when the Minister of In-
dian Affairs and Northern Development, Ronald Irwin,
released a consultation paper entitled ‘Devolution of the
Northern Affairs Program to the Yukon Government’
(Hurley 2009). This paper facilitated the signing of an
accord that outlined the process for devolution. Several
years later, the negotiating parties completed devolution
negotiations by signing the Devolution Transfer Agree-
ment (DTA) on 29 October 2001.
By signing the DTA, the Canadian government agreed
to replace the Yukon Act with new legislation that
provided the Yukon legislature with the authority to make
laws concerning public land and water (Hurley 2009). In
addition, the Canadian government repealed the Yukon
Placer Mining Act, the Yukon Quartz Mining Act, and
the Yukon Waters Act so that the Yukon government
could develop legislation to replace these federal laws.
Devolution was finally complete.
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Nunavut
The territory of Nunavut was the result of a comprehens-
ive land claims agreement signed in 1993 by the Inuit
in the eastern Arctic of Canada, the federal government
of Canada, and the GNWT. In addition to granting the
Inuit signatories a variety of land rights and jurisdictions,
it also contained provisions for a political accord that
would establish a new territory in the eastern Arctic
(Henderson 2007: 1). The new territory, which came into
being in 1999, adopted a public government structure,
meaning that all residents could vote and run for office.
The government is led by a premier, who is assisted
by a cabinet made up of elected representatives from
the legislative assembly, which must work with a 19-
member legislative assembly to pass legislation. In terms
of devolution, the GN benefited from the timing of its
creation in 1999 when all major powers and jurisdictions
were already transferred to the GNWT except for lands
and natural resources. Thus, the GN enjoys many of the
same powers and jurisdictions that the Yukon territorial
government and the GNWT have except for lands and
resources (White 2009). Although the GN has expressed
an interest in beginning negotiations with the federal
government over this final issue, negotiations have yet to
occur beyond the creation of a devolution protocol that
outlines how devolution negotiations might proceed in
the future (Mayer 2007).
Explaining devolution: a theoretical framework
So what explains the success of the Yukon territorial
government in negotiating a final devolution transfer
agreement in 2001 and what explains the failure of
the governments of the NWT and Nunavut to do the
same? Devolution negotiations relating to territorial lands
and resources are somewhat similar to comprehensive
land claims negotiations. In both cases, for instance,
negotiating actors seek to redistribute a certain set of
collective goods, which in this case is lands and resources
(Alcantara 2007, 2008). There are a number of important
differences, however. Modern treaties involve the trans-
fer of ownership rights whereas devolution negotiations
relating to land and resources involve the transfer of
administrative control (Armstrong 2010; Dewar 2010).
Whereas comprehensive land claims negotiations are
trilateral, devolution negotiations are typically bilateral,
between the territorial government and the federal gov-
ernment of Canada (Dacks 1990; McArthur 2007). The
one exception may be Nunavut, since informal discus-
sions in the past have included Nunavut Tunngavik Inc.,
responsible for looking after land claims post treaty, at the
table (Rawson 2010; Mayer 2007). Nonetheless, formal
territorial devolution negotiations are generally bilateral,
with the federal and territorial governments coming to the
table with a set of goals that they hope to achieve in a final
agreement.
The likelihood of being able to achieve a final de-
volution agreement is strongly dependent on the distance
between the preferences of the negotiating governments
(see Alcantara 2008; Simeon 2006: 14–15; Tsebelis
2002). Preferences are the goals that the negotiating act-
ors have during negotiations relating to territorial lands
and resources. Yet the content and distance of preferences
alone do not by themselves explain negotiation outcomes.
Power relations are important for structuring the rela-
tionship between negotiating actors in these situations
(Alcantara 2008; Simeon 2006; Tsebelis 2002). Much
like aboriginal treaty negotiations, devolution negoti-
ations involve government participants with significant
power differentials, which in this case favour the federal
government over the territorial government. Territorial
governments, for instance, do not enjoy the same con-
stitutional status as provinces and, at least in the case of
the NWT and Yukon, they exist somewhat at the pleasure
of the federal government (Cameron and White 1995;
Smyth 2010). More importantly, all of the negotiation
stakes, such as land and natural/human resources, are by
default in the hands of the federal government and the
federal government has no obligation to transfer con-
trol of these jurisdictions immediately to the territorial
governments. Indeed, territorial governments do not have
access to something akin to ‘aboriginal rights and title’
or ‘aboriginal traditional territories’ to bolster their de-
volution claims. As a result, the federal government is in
essence a veto player (Tsebelis 2002) during devolution
negotiations, and the likelihood of the negotiating parties
completing a final agreement will depend on the ability
of territorial governments to satisfy somehow the prefer-
ences and expectations of the federal government. Failure
to do so will result in the federal government exercising
its veto, meaning it will continue to administer territorial
lands and resources until the territorial government can
meet the preferences and expectations of the federal
government.
The exact set of factors that generate a final devolution
agreement are very much context-specific. In addition to
the differences in power resources among the negotiating
actors, the negotiating environment also plays a role
in specifying the exact nature of federal government
expectations. In comprehensive land claims negotiations,
the aboriginal actors have to adopt compatible goals
with those of the federal, provincial, and/or territorial
governments, to minimise the use of confrontational
tactics, to foster internal group cohesion, and to generate
positive government perceptions of the aboriginal group
(Alcantara 2007). In devolution negotiations, the federal
government is interested not only in a final agreement
that is compatible with its preferences, but it will also
only complete a final agreement with those territorial
governments that it views as politically mature (Bannon
2011; Richardson 2011; Wright 1995), and with those
territorial governments that it perceives to have achieved
a ‘critical mass of support’ among aboriginal groups in
the region. Indeed, a number of anonymous and non-
anonymous interviewees (Bannon 2011; Dewar 2010;
Leas 2010; McDonald 2010; Richardson 2011), as well
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as archival documents (Intergovernmental and Aboriginal
Affairs 1994: 2, 1995: 2), have stressed that this critical
mass of aboriginal support, a threshold which has been
left intentionally vague, is necessary before the federal
government will sign a final devolution agreement. Over
time, the territorial governments have also gradually
internalised this requirement as part of their own nego-
tiation strategies and processes. This is especially true in
the NWT and Nunavut where the proportion of aboriginal
people within their borders is large. Thus, aboriginal
actors in the three territories act as additional veto players
in territorial devolution negotiations, even though they
are not directly involved in the bilateral negotiations.
In sum, devolution negotiations are similar to treaty
negotiations in that negotiating parties seek to maximise
their preferences. However, power differentials between
the territorial and federal governments mean that territ-
orial governments must meet the expectations and pref-
erences of the federal government. These expectations
and preferences are context-specific, reflecting on the
one hand the significant differences in power resources
among the negotiating governments, and the political
context of the Canadian territorial north on the other.
In terms of the latter point, devolution has been a long
and incremental process in the Canadian arctic, reflecting
the federal government’s desire to transfer powers to the
territorial governments only when they are deemed to
be mature enough to handle the responsibilities (Bannon
2011; Braden 2011; Handley 2011; McKinnon 2010;
Smyth 2010; Wright 1995). Politics in the north is also
very much dominated by the large and influential pres-
ence of aboriginal groups (Abele and others 2009; Dacks
1990; McArthur 2007), and thus devolution negotiations
very much require a consideration of aboriginal consent
even if aboriginal groups are not directly involved in the
formal bilateral negotiations.
This paper uses elements of rational choice and game
theory to explain variation in devolution negotiation
outcomes in the Canadian territorial north. Some read-
ers, however, might argue that these theoretical tools
are inappropriate because territorial devolution is highly
complex and diverse, whereas rational choice and game
theory rely on the simplification of situations to their
basic elements. The basic argument here is that complex
situations require complex theories.
The legitimacy of this criticism, however, depends
heavily on the relationship between complexity and the-
ory. According to King, Keohane, and Verba (1994:
9–10), ‘social science constitutes an attempt to make
sense of social situations that we perceive as more
or less complex. We need to recognise, however, that
what we perceive as complexity is not entirely inherent
in phenomena: the world is not naturally divided into
simple and complex sets of events. On the contrary, the
perceived complexity of a situation depends in part on
how well we can simplify reality, and our capacity to
simplify depends on whether we can specify outcomes
and explanatory variables in a coherent way . . . . Thus
“complexity” is partly conditional on the state of our
theory.’
In other words, in the absence of objective measures
for determining which political situations and phenomena
are complex and which are not, such a determination
will rely heavily on the theoretical framework employed.
Indeed, even the task of choosing objective measures
is inherently difficult, since the choice of measures will
depend heavily on the theory used by the researcher. As
such, it would be a mistake to reject rational choice and
game theoretical approaches to the study of territorial
governance solely on the basis of a mismatch between
a theory’s assumptions about complexity and the reader’s
preferred theoretical approach to the study of a political
phenomenon.
In the next section of the paper, I present some
empirical evidence to illustrate how the extent to which
territorial goals are compatible with those of the federal
government, the level at which the federal government
perceives the territorial government’s political maturity,
and government perceptions regarding the achievement
of aboriginal consent, have generated different outcomes
for the three territorial governments in the Canadian
north.
Explaining devolution: some empirical evidence
Specifying the preferences
Given the importance of preferences in determining out-
comes, the following section specifies the preferences of
the federal, territorial, and aboriginal actors involved in
devolution negotiations in the Canadian arctic. Beginning
with the federal government, federal officials have long
been interested in the territorial north for a variety of
reasons. Broadly speaking, federal policy has long been
driven by the nation-building imperative, in which the
political development of the Canadian territories was
seen as the last frontier in the construction of a fully
mature and independent Canada (Cameron and Campbell
2009: 199; Coates and others 2008: 201; Richardson
2011; Robertson and others 2010). Tied to this objective
has been a strong and consistent desire to defend the
sovereign interests of the Canadian government in the
region against competing claims by other nations (Coates
and others 2008: 59, 116). In terms of the devolution of
lands and resources specifically, however, federal prefer-
ences centre strongly around the economic potential of
the Canadian north (Chretien 1969: 2). Mark Dickerson
(1992) and others (Coates and others 2008) have illus-
trated how the political and constitutional development of
the Canadian north have long been driven by the federal
government’s desire to exploit the natural resources of
the region, which requires the creation of infrastructure,
human resources and capacity, and local/territorial gov-
ernment. As such, according to three anonymous fed-
eral government interviewees, two anonymous GNWT
interviewees, and one former GNWT official, federal
policymakers have long viewed the natural resources of
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the north as ‘Canadian resources’ that belong to, and
should benefit, the entire country (Richardson 2011).
This approach is consistent with federal views about
equalisation, in which all provinces should benefit instead
of only certain provinces or regions benefiting dispropor-
tionately (Expert Panel on Equalization and TFF 2005:
8–9; Intergovernmental Core Group 1993: 32). Overall,
therefore, federal preferences relating to the devolution
of lands and resources revolve around the desire to max-
imise resource revenues while maintaining a consistent
approach to dividing those revenues among the federal
and sub-national units in the federation. The content
of these preferences as they relate to the devolution of
lands and resources are confirmed by interview data from
two anonymous GNWT officials, two anonymous former
senior federal officials, and two non-anonymous officials
(Bannon 2011; Richardson 2011).
A number of interviewees also suggested that the fed-
eral government is driven to reduce its costs related to ad-
ministering territorial lands, resources, and programmes,
simply because these costs are significant (Government
of Northwest Territories 1995; Government of Northwest
Territories 1993: 2; Robertson and others 2010). Several
anonymous federal and former senior federal officials,
for instance, mentioned that it was not coincidence that
the first things that were devolved to the territorial gov-
ernments were programmes that cost money, such as
education, social services, and health care, and that the
main revenue generating jurisdictions, such as land and
resources, were left to the end (see also Handley 2011).
The recent budgets of the territorial governments are
revealing for illustrating the costliness of governance in
the Canadian north. In 2006–2007, for instance, Yukon
government expenditures were $813,864,000 while rev-
enues were $844,783,000, with the latter amount includ-
ing $609,715,000 in federal transfers. Similarly, in NWT,
expenditures during that fiscal year were $1,205,111,000
while revenues were $1,203,778,000, with the lat-
ter amount including $879,318,000 in federal trans-
fers. In Nunavut, expenditures during 2006–2007 were
$1,110,906,000 while revenues were $1,218,558,000,
which includes $1,132,547,000 in federal transfers. As a
result, the federal government has long been interested
in devolving the responsibility of these direct costs to
the territorial governments as means of helping to control
federal expenditures writ large.
In short, federal preferences in devolution negoti-
ations relating to territorial land and resources are very
much driven by the desire to maintain revenue streams,
decrease direct costs, and ensure that territorial shares
of natural resource revenues are consistent with federal
principles of equalisation (Intergovernmental Core Group
1993: 32). The natural resources of the north have long
been seen as important to the economy of the country
and the federal government wants to ensure that those
revenues continue to flow into the national economy
post-devolution (Expert Panel on Equalization and TFF
2005). The devolution of lands and resources is also
driven by the desire to offload the direct costs of de-
livering programmes and services in the north, and so
negotiations relating to human resources and adminis-
trative responsibilities are very much structured by these
federal preferences. Finally, the federal government in-
sists that although territorial governments should be able
to benefit from on-shore natural resources development
projects that fall within their borders post-devolution,
the benefits that the territorial governments accrue from
these resources cannot be disproportionate. Much like
how provincial equalisation ensures that the entire coun-
try benefits from the uneven distribution of natural re-
sources throughout the country, so too should the rest of
Canada benefit from the natural resources located in the
north.
In terms of territorial preferences, the three territorial
governments have long been interested in furthering
the political and constitutional development of their re-
spective regions. A major component of that develop-
ment is gaining administrative control over their land
and resources. In 1905, the provinces of Alberta and
Saskatchewan were created out of a portion of the NWT.
However, it was only in 1930 that the federal government
transferred lands and resources to these provinces. The
territorial situation today is similar in that the territories
have a variety of powers akin to what the provinces have.
However, in the case of the NWT and Nunavut, they do
not control their lands and resources. Territorial officials
believe that the political and constitutional development
of their territories requires that their governments gain
control over these important jurisdictions, much like
Alberta and Saskatchewan did in 1930.
In addition to gaining jurisdiction over lands and re-
sources (Cunning 2010; GNWT 1989; Richardson 2011)
to further the political and constitutional development
of their regions (GNWT 1990), the territorial govern-
ments have a strong interest in negotiating a deal that
maximises their economic independence from the federal
government. This means gaining control over their lands
and resources so that they can create a regulatory and
administrative environment that is more efficient in ad-
dressing local needs and goals. It also means negotiating
a deal that limits the financial liability of any economic
developments approved by the federal government prior
to devolution. Finally, and most importantly, territorial
officials desire an agreement that includes a natural re-
source revenue provision that does not place unfair and
restrictive restraints on the fiscal and policy capacity of
the northern governments to address local concerns. This
latter point is particularly important in that territorial
governments want to keep every dollar generated from
economic development and resource extraction projects
within their borders. They do not want the federal gov-
ernment to significantly reduce federal transfer payments
proportional to the natural resource revenues that the
territorial governments generate post-devolution. Doing
so would create significant disincentives for the territ-
orial governments to pursue economic development and
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would prevent them from eliminating their dependence
on the federal transfers (Bannon 2011; Handley 2011;
McDonald 2010; Feehan 2009; GNWT 1993).
The final set of actors whose preferences need to be
specified are the aboriginal groups in the territorial north.
Although one might have assumed significant differences
to exist among these groups, given their numbers and
diversity, surprisingly their core preferences relating to
devolution are remarkably similar. The main concern of
aboriginal groups in all three territories is the impact of
a devolution agreement on their current and future land
claims/self-government negotiations and agreements. In
Nunavut, for instance, the Nunavut Tunngavik Incorpor-
ated (NTI) supports natural resource devolution only if
the final agreement ‘does not abrogate or derogate from
any rights of Inuit and the NLCA’ [Nunavut Land Claims
Agreement] (Mayer 2007: 22). In the Yukon Territory,
all fourteen Yukon first nations expressed concerns that
the federal and territorial governments of Canada had
to complete comprehensive land claims agreements with
the Yukon first nations before any devolution agreement
could be achieved (Wright 1995: 9–10). According to
Victor Mitander, Chief Negotiator, Council of Yukon
First Nations, ‘The Council of Yukon First Nations and
Yukon first nations have historically been opposed to
the devolution of lands and resources, and the basic
reason is because there are a number of Yukon first
nations that have yet to conclude their final and self-
government agreements. For those reasons we’ve asked
that devolution should not proceed until we have con-
cluded these agreements’ (Canada 1997; see also Leas
2010; McDonald 1996).
A similar concern drives the preferences of the ab-
original groups in the NWT (Handley 2011). Aboriginal
groups in the NWT have long been wary about the
possible impact that devolution might have on their in-
complete or completed land claims negotiations (GNWT
1998: 5–6; Wright 1995: 14–17). According to former
Deh Cho Grand Chief Herb Norwegian, for instance,
‘Canada has no right to transfer ownership or control over
any land in the Deh Cho territory . . .. Not one grain of
sand in the Deh Cho land belongs to Canada’ (Raven
2005; see also Unrau 2007; Roland 2008; Thompson
2011). The Akaticho have expressed similar sentiments,
saying that the timing for a devolution deal was wrong.
‘It just doesn’t make sense; it’s not realistic. I think
the time is wrong right now. The right timing could be
when all the [land] claims are finalized’ (CBC 2007;
CBC 2010; Beauliu 2011). Those aboriginal groups that
have completed land claims agreements have expressed
concerns about the potential impact of devolution on their
jurisdictions. They have also been critical of the lack of
consultations undertaken by the Crown regarding how
best to minimise the impact of the devolution agreement
on indigenous autonomy. The Tlicho, for instance, have
expressed reservations about the potential impact of the
agreement on their completed land claims agreement
(Makohoniuk 2010; Stokell 2011). Gwich’in leaders have
stated that ‘this constitutional duty, judicially referred
to as the “honour of the Crown,” requires adequate
and appropriate “consultation” and “accommodation”
to address the concerns of the Aboriginal governments
respecting the impact on existing Aboriginal and Treaty
rights of the devolution process and terms of the signed
Devolution AIP’ (Gargan and Nerysoo 2011). The Sahtu
share these concerns, stating that federal and territorial
government officials ‘are not listening at all’ and that they
‘were caught pretty much off guard’ by the leaked AIP
(May 2010; Yakeleya 2011).
A second aboriginal preference relating to the devol-
ution of lands and resources is the desire to maximise
the aboriginal share of the net fiscal benefit. Indeed,
the nature of this round of devolution negotiations is
such that the main negotiation issue is who should get
what from the revenues generated by the development of
natural resources in the territory. Aboriginal groups in all
three territories are very much interested in ensuring that
their governments receive a fair portion of the revenues
generated. In Yukon, the first nations agreed to a formula
that in essence gave them 50% of the net fiscal benefit
that the territory received up to a cap of $2 million,
after which the benefit shrinks to 10% (Irlbalcher-Fox
and Mills 2007: 6). In the NWT, aboriginal groups
are pushing for something that is at least similar to
the 50% formula that the Yukon first nations received.
Indeed, some anonymous aboriginal interviewees claim
that much of the rhetoric surrounding the effect of de-
volution on aboriginal land claims and the Crown’s duty
to consult prior to signing a final agreement are in fact
negotiating strategies for forcing the GNWT to increase
the aboriginal share of territorial resource revenues from
25% to 50%. These same interviewees argue that most
of the aboriginal opposition in the NWT would most
likely disappear if the GNWT agreed to this change. NTI
has been less vocal about this issue in Nunavut since
devolution negotiations have not proceeded much beyond
the completion of the protocol agreement.
Given these preferences, the following section illus-
trates how the different outcomes experienced by Yukon
Territorial Government (YTG), GNWT, and GN are par-
tially explained by the extent to which the territorial
governments have been willing to negotiate an agree-
ment that is compatible with the goals of the federal
government. It also argues that varying perceptions of
Aboriginal consent in the NWT and federal perceptions
of Nunavut’s lack of political maturity have prevented
these territories from completing final agreements.
Satisfying federal preferences
Federal preferences in devolution negotiations revolve
around the desire to maintain federal government rev-
enue streams from natural resource developments in the
territories, decrease its direct costs related to the admin-
istration of the territorial north, and ensure that territorial
shares of natural resource revenues are consistent with
the federal principles of equalisation. Both the Yukon
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devolution transfer agreement (YDTA) and the NWT de-
volution AIP contain provisions that are congruent with
these goals. The net fiscal benefit provisions in the de-
volution agreements, for instance, are illustrative of how
territorial officials were able to complete a devolution
settlement by agreeing to provisions that were compatible
with federal preferences to maximise federal revenues
from territorial resources while respecting the principles
of equalisation. In the YDTA, for instance, the territorial
government annually is allowed to keep up to a maximum
of $3 million in revenues derived from natural resource
developments (except for oil and gas), after which there
is a dollar-for-dollar reduction in the annual Territorial
Formula Financing (TFF) grant from the federal govern-
ment (Government of Canada and Government of Yukon
2001: s. 7.27). For oil and gas revenues, the cap is the
same except that the reduction in transfers is based on
a sliding scale, starting at 60% and rising progressively
to 80% (Feehan 2009: 355). Aboriginal groups that have
signed the Umbrella Final Agreement (UFA) and have
completed final agreements are entitled to ‘50% of the
first $2 million in royalties from mineral resources and
10% thereafter’ (Feehan 2009: 349). In the late 1990s and
early 2000s, the level of natural resource development
activity in the territory was negligible and so there was
little risk that this formula would punish either govern-
ment (Cameron 2010; Cunning 2010; McDonald 2010).
However, in recent years, the level of mining activity has
increased, leading territorial officials to lobby the federal
government to renegotiate the cap (Yukon Government
2011).
The net fiscal benefit formula in the NWT devolution
AIP is similar to Yukon, although different in scope,
reflecting the fact that the NWT contains significantly
more natural resources than does Yukon. As a result,
GNWT officials have long argued that any devolution
agreement had to ensure that the GNWT received every
dollar produced from natural resource developments
post-devolution (Braden 2011; Patterson 2011; Van Loon
2010). This difference in the scope and magnitude of
natural resource reserves in the two territories and the
insistence of GNWT officials that any net fiscal benefit
formula had to contain provisions that did not result
in clawbacks to federal transfers, made negotiating an
agreement impossible to complete for the GNWT. The
net fiscal benefit in the current NWT devolution AIP,
however, represents a significant shift in the GNWT’s
negotiation position to one that is more compatible with
federal preferences. The result is a completed AIP. Ac-
cording to chapter 12 of the AIP, for instance, 50% of
resource revenues are excluded from ‘the offset calcula-
tion against the GNWT’s Territorial Formula Financing
grant . . . up to an overall fiscal capacity cap equal
to 5 percent of the NWT’s Gross Expenditure Base’
(Government of Canada and Government of Northwest
Territories 2010: s. 12.1b). In short, this means that
should a final devolution agreement be reached, GNWT
resource revenues will also be subject to a cap much like
in Yukon, except that the cap is expressed as a percentage
of the territory’s gross expenditure base (GEB) rather
than an exact dollar amount cap. In practice, for instance,
this would have meant that the NWT cap last year would
have been approximately $60 million, based on a GEB of
$1.2 billion. Of that $60 million, aboriginal signatories
to the devolution agreement would have received 25% of
territorial resource revenues, or $15 million.
In sum, in both the NWT and Yukon, the federal and
territorial governments were interested in maximising the
potential revenues from natural resource developments.
For the federal government, it was also interested in
a net fiscal benefit that was consistent with the prin-
ciples of equalisation. In Yukon, development activity
and potential for activity at the time were significantly
low so it was slightly easier for their officials to sign
a devolution transfer agreement with a hard cap of
$3 million (Cameron 2010; Cunning 2010; McDonald
2010). In comparison, the NWT contains significantly
more natural resource deposits and so negotiators were
unable to generate a final agreement, let alone an AIP,
until GNWT officials under the governments of Premiers
Joe Handley and Floyd Roland were willing to accept
a net fiscal benefit that distributed resource revenues
in a way that was consistent with federal preferences.
Government of Canada officials have long argued that the
net fiscal benefit had to be consistent with the principles
of equalisation in that no one province should benefit
disproportionately from its natural resources. A number
of anonymous federal and GNWT officials confirm that
the net fiscal benefit formula had to meet this standard
and that the GNWT AIP was completed mainly because
territorial officials agreed to such a formula.
The devolution agreements were also consistent with
territorial goals relating to wanting to take control over
their lands and resources to further their political devel-
opment. They were also consistent with federal interests
in cutting costs (Robertson and others 2010). In the
Yukon agreement, for instance, chapter 2 transferred
control over territorial land and waters, while chapter 3
detailed the transfer of human resources to the territorial
government. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 devolved authority
over Northern Affairs Program properties, assets and
contracts, forest resources, and environmental matters,
including waste sites. Chapters 7 and 8 addressed con-
tinuing and one off financial transfers and the execution
of the agreement.
All of these devolved jurisdictions and assets repres-
ented significant savings for the federal government. In
terms of human resources, the federal government laid
off approximately 250 federal employees, with the Yukon
territorial government hiring back approximately 90%
of those employees (O’Farrell 2010; McDonald 2010;
Robertson and others 2010). In terms of fire suppres-
sion, several interviewees (Cunning 2010; Robertson and
others 2010) reported that some officials have criticised
the Yukon government for not getting enough funds in
the agreement to cover the costs of fire suppression. The
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federal government agreed to pay for fire suppression on
a sliding scale for the first five years after devolution at
which point the territorial government would take on full
responsibility. The fear among some residents of Yukon
is that one extraordinary forest fire season could bankrupt
the territorial government (Robertson and others 2010),
thus illustrating the potential savings the federal govern-
ment may be accruing through devolution. A number of
YTG officials have also mentioned that the devolution
of liability over waste sites was an immense cost-saving
transfer for the federal government, despite the federal
government agreeing to be liable for sites approved pre–
2003 and the YTG agreeing to be liable for post–2003
sites. The old Faro mine, for instance, has cost $500
million dollars to remediate (Robertson and others 2010).
Post-devolution, the federal government will continue to
reap the financial benefits of future mining sites, after the
YTG collects the first $3 million in revenues, and pay
none of the cleanup costs.
Satisfying the aboriginal veto
Although the GNWT did complete an AIP in 2010,
only the YTG has signed a final devolution transfer
agreement. The completion of both of these agreements
was only possible once territorial officials became willing
to sign an agreement that contained provisions that were
compatible with federal preferences relating to revenues,
costs and equalisation. What, then, explains the GNWT’s
lack of success in signing a final agreement? The main
obstacle has been the lack of perceived aboriginal con-
sent. In Yukon, the fourteen Yukon first nations were
initially opposed to devolution because none of the abori-
ginal groups had completed their land claims agreements.
Federal officials, and eventually, territorial officials, came
to realise that ‘a critical mass’ of aboriginal support
was necessary before any devolution agreement could
be completed (Leas 2010; McDonald 2010; McKinnon
2010; Robertson and others 2010; Wright 1995: 9). In
1993, the Yukon first nations, represented by the Council
for Yukon Indians, and the federal and Yukon govern-
ments, completed decades of treaty negotiations by sign-
ing the UFA. This provides the framework under which
each Yukon first nation must negotiate its individual
final agreement. In 1995, four Yukon first nations signed
final agreements and by 2001, three more first nations
had completed final agreements. This steady progress of
completed treaties in combination with the signing of
the UFA by all Yukon first nations in 1993 was seen
by federal and territorial officials as clear indicators that
aboriginal consent had been achieved, thus clearing the
way for the signing of the Yukon DTA in 2001 (Leas
2010; Robertson and others 2010; Smyth 2010).
In contrast, the role and position of aboriginal groups
in the NWT have been more complex (GNWT 1993: 2,
1996: 5, 2000: 1–2; Wright 1995: 14–16). In general,
with some exceptions, the Yukon first nations have al-
ways been somewhat more cohesive than the aboriginal
groups in the NWT. Whereas the Yukon first nations
have tended to work together first through the Council
of Yukon Indians and later the Council of Yukon First
Nations, the aboriginal groups in the NWT have been less
unified, with formal cooperation lasting briefly through
the now-defunct aboriginal summit. Whereas all the ab-
original groups in Yukon signed the UFA at the same time
and 11 groups completed final agreements in fairly rapid
succession, only four groups in the NWT have completed
comprehensive land claims agreements over a 20 year
period (Inuvialuit in 1984; Gwich’in in 1992; Sahtu in
1993; Tlicho in 2003). As a result, federal and territorial
officials in the GNWT have long sought for a more
substantial indication of direct (that is signing the AIP) or
indirect (that is a large number of completed land claims
agreements) aboriginal consent regarding devolution. On
9 May 2007, GNWT Premier Joe Handley reached a
separate agreement with aboriginal leaders from the
Inuvialuit Regional Corporation, the Gwich’in Tribal
Council, the Sahtu Secretariat Inc., and the NWT Metis
Nation, regarding resource revenue sharing. In section G
of this agreement, the negotiating parties agreed that the
aboriginal signatories ‘shall be entitled to a share of up
to 25% of the Net Fiscal Benefit to be used to promote
political development and for the delivery of government
programs and services in the NWT’ (GNWT 2007: 3).
Several federal and territorial anonymous interviewees
suggested that government officials saw this agreement
as successfully meeting the requirement for a critical
mass of aboriginal support. The result was accelerated
devolution negotiations and a draft AIP in 2010. Some
might suggest that an additional explanatory factor may
be related to the fact that some current Aboriginal leaders
have served as territorial cabinet ministers and Premiers
in the past and that these previous experiences may make
negotiations easier to accomplish. However, the evidence
is mixed. For instance, both Nellie Cournoyea of the IRC
and Richard Nerysoo of the Gwich’in were once premiers
of the NWT yet only Cournoyea is supportive of the
current AIP.
Unfortunately for territorial officials, two of the ori-
ginal signatories to the 2007 GWNT-aboriginal resource
revenue sharing agreement, the Gwich’in Tribal Coun-
cil and the Sahtu Secretariat Incorporated, have since
reneged on the agreement and decided not to support
the 2010 AIP. Six anonymous aboriginal and/or territ-
orial interviewees suggested that a change in political
leadership within the two aboriginal groups was one of
the main reasons why the groups no longer supported
the devolution agreement. Another reason was that the
aboriginal groups believed that the federal and territorial
governments failed adequately to consult them during
devolution negotiations. As a result, commentators sug-
gest that the devolution deal is unlikely to be ratified.
Anonymous interviewees also suggest that the fact that
the main architect of the deal, former GNWT Premier
Floyd Roland, decided not to run for re-election, indicates
that the AIP is likely to be shelved. They suggest that
aboriginal consent will only be achieved if adequate
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consultations, and more importantly, a dramatic rise in
the aboriginal share of the net fiscal benefit, are achieved.
In sum, the evidence suggests that a completed final
devolution agreement requires government officials to
perceive that aboriginal consent has been achieved in
some way. In the case of Yukon, federal and territorial
officials were confident that consent had been achieved
with the signing of the UFA and the rapid succession
of final land claims agreements signed prior to 2001.
These findings are confirmed by interviews with federal,
territorial, and aboriginal officials in Yukon. In the NWT,
devolution negotiations did not progress very far for a
long time for a variety of reasons, including the lack of
perceived aboriginal consent. Once the GNWT was able
to get four aboriginal groups to sign a side agreement
relating to resource revenue sharing in 2007, only then
did federal and territorial officials believe that sufficient
aboriginal consent had been achieved, leading to the suc-
cessful negotiation of an AIP in 2010. However, progress
on a final agreement has been stalled by two of the
aboriginal groups withdrawing their support. Anonymous
territorial and aboriginal interviewees suggest that it is
highly likely that future devolution negotiations in the
NWT will only proceed if the GNWT can somehow
convince at least two additional aboriginal groups to
endorse the AIP. These same interviewees suggest that
this goal is possible if the GNWT agrees to raise the
aboriginal share of the GNWT’s net fiscal benefit to 50%.
Federal perceptions of territorial government
maturity and capacity
A final factor that determines variation in devolution
negotiation outcomes is the federal government’s per-
ception of territorial maturity and capacity. A num-
ber of interviewees and archival data suggest that the
differences in the rate at which devolution has been
occurring in the territories is related to how the federal
government perceives the level of maturity and capacity
of the territorial governments. The data indicate that
the YTG has long been viewed as an established and
mature government with a capable bureaucracy, at least in
comparison to the other territories, and that this fact has
influenced the rate of devolution in all three territories
(Bannon 2011; Braden 2011; Cameron 2010; Handley
2011; Rawson 2010; Smyth 2010; Van Loon 2010). For
example, federal officials have long been impressed that
the YTG adopted party politics, a form of politics that
is more ‘conventional’ and familiar to federal officials
than the consensus system in the NWT. Indeed, one
anonymous government official mentioned that a federal
minister of Indian Affairs during the mid 2000s told
federal and territorial officials in private meetings that he
was not impressed with the status of governance in the
NWT, specifically referencing the consensus government
system used by the GNWT. This federal position has his-
torical roots. In a speech given in Whitehorse in 1969, for
instance, then Minister of Indian Affairs, Jean Chretien
stated that based on ‘your much greater percentage of
residents already familiar with the institutions and tradi-
tions of responsible, responsive government. . .’ that the
Yukon was ‘in a stronger position than the people in the
Northwest Territories to accept a considerable measure of
local responsibility for government’ (Chretien 1969: 3).
Complicating matters further were discussions at
the time surrounding the creation of Nunavut out of the
eastern portions of the NWT. In the mid 1990s, the
federal government commissioned Robert Wright to as-
sess the feasibility of completing devolution in the NWT
and Yukon. In 1995, Wright delivered his report to
then Indian Affairs Minister Ron Irwin. Based on his
research, he recommended that the federal government
move quickly to devolve all remaining province-like
powers to the YTG within a 18 month to two year time
frame. He believed that the YTG had the capacity to take
on these responsibilities. In contrast, he suggested that
the federal government devolve province-like powers to
the GNWT at a much slower rate to allow for the GNWT
to complete the process of creating Nunavut out of its
territories. Once that division was completed, only then
could devolution proceed for the NWT (Wright 1995).
In sum, the fact that Yukon achieved devolution before
the NWT is partly the result of the federal government’s
different perceptions of the political development and
maturity of the two territories.
The importance of federal government perceptions is
more starkly illustrated in the case of Nunavut. Indeed,
devolution negotiations have not moved beyond the pro-
tocol agreement mainly because of federal perceptions of
Nunavut’s capacity. The GN’s well documented growing
pains have made federal officials reluctant to pursue
devolution negotiations until the GN can properly address
its capacity issues, which include satisfying the s. 23 of
the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement requirement to hire
Inuit officials, and simply filling vacant positions in the
regional government offices (Rawson 2011; Cameron and
Campbell 2009: 216). This requirement to demonstrate
capacity as a precondition for devolution was confirmed
in a recent government report written by lawyer Paul
Mayer for the federal government in 2007 (Mayer 2007).
In that report, he found that GN faced enormous chal-
lenges in undertaking its current responsibilities, which
is partly due to lacking sufficient human resources within
the territorial bureaucracy. In 2010, for instance, GN
had over 900 vacant positions in its bureaucracy (GN
2010). This is out of a total population of 33,330 (as
of 1 October 2011) As a result, Mayer suggested that
devolution in Nunavut should not occur until this capacity
issue was satisfactory addressed: ‘if the human resource
capacity issue cannot be satisfactorily dealt with, then
the right conditions will not be in place to transfer
federal responsibilities (Mayer 2007: 46–47). The fact
that the federal government agrees with this position is
reiterated in Nunavut Hansard. According to Nunavut
Legislative Assembly member Moses Aupaluktuq, for
instance, ‘this week’s Budget Address that was delivered
by our Minister of Finance stated that and I quote,
EXPLAINING DEVOLUTION NEGOTIATION OUTCOMES IN THE CANADIAN TERRITORIAL NORTH 177
“from our conversations with the federal government,
we understand that they have not seen clearly that we
are prepared to handle additional responsibilities”’ that
would flow from a devolution agreement (Government of
Nunavut 2010: 12). Until federal officials perceive GN
as having sufficient capacity and maturity to undertake
its current responsibilities and jurisdictions, the evidence
suggests that the federal government will not engage in
further devolution negotiations with GN.
Conclusion
This paper has argued that variation in devolution nego-
tiation outcomes relating to lands and resources can be
explained by examining three sets of factors. First, in
light of the federal government’s dominant position in ne-
gotiations, territorial negotiators must negotiate an agree-
ment that is compatible with federal preferences relating
to resource revenues, equalisation, and the reduction of
costs. Both the YTG and the Handley/Roland GNWT
governments were willing to satisfy federal preferences
in this manner. However, only the YTG has been able
to complete a final agreement. The reason that YTG has
been successful whereas the GNWT has not is because
devolution negotiation outcomes also depend on the ex-
tent to which government officials perceive that sufficient
aboriginal consent has been obtained. In Yukon, the fact
that all of the Yukon first nations signed the UFA in 1993
and that a majority of aboriginal groups completed lands
claims agreements at a fairly brisk rate were sufficient
for federal and territorial negotiators to sign a DTA. In
the NWT, in contrast, an AIP was negotiated only after
the consent of four aboriginal groups was obtained in a
2007 resource revenue sharing agreement. However, the
fact that two of the four groups have withdrawn their
support means that the GNWT AIP is likely to be shelved
or scrapped.
The final factor that determines variation in devol-
ution negotiation outcomes is federal perceptions of
territorial capacity and maturity. The evidence suggests
that the different timing of devolution in the NWT and
Yukon was partly the result of the YTG being seen as
more mature and politically developed than the GNWT.
A more stark example is the status of Nunavut devol-
ution negotiations, which have not proceeded beyond
the negotiation of a protocol agreement. The evidence
suggests that the lack of progress on the Nunavut file is
mainly the result of federal reluctance to negotiate with
a government that it believes does not have the capacity
to undertake its current responsibilities and obligations,
let alone those that would flow from a final devolution
agreement.
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